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Abstract 
This paper discusses Japanese motor vehicle manufacturing investment 
and state intervention measures in the Australian market. Australia’s 
auto industry is an extension of global motor vehicle manufacturers 
with a small number of domestic manufacturing firms that form a part 
of the global supply chain.  Toyota Motor Corporation, Mitsubishi 
Motor Corporation, General Motors Corporation and Ford Motor 
Company all have had extensive investments in the Australian market.  
In the past, the Australian market was also a host to investments from 
Volkswagen AG, Chrysler LLC, Nissan Motor Company Limited and 
British Leyland Motor Corporation.  The size of the industry has shrunk 
recently with the March 2008 shut down of manufacturing by 
Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited (MMAL), not long after the 
company’s emergence from a long and significant restructuring.  Still, 
the auto industry remains the largest single manufacturing sector in 
Australia both in terms of investment levels and the number of people 
employed.  Thus, Japanese auto manufacturing investment in Australia 
require an evaluation, now that the federal government has completed 
the 2008 ‘Review of Australia’s Automotive Industry’.  The paper 
focuses on Toyota Motor Corporation Australia (TMC Australia) in 
Victoria and (the recently shut down) MMAL in South Australia. 
 
 
Toyota Motor Corporation Australia (TMC Australia) is presently the only 
Japanese motor vehicle manufacturer with the shut down of Mitsubishi Motors 
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Australia Limited (MMAL) in March 2008.  In 1992 Nissan Motor Company 
(Australia) Pty Ltd stopped manufacturing in Australia.  These three Japanese 
motor vehicle manufacturers had originally set up production in Australia to 
get behind the tariff walls because producing and selling in the local market 
was cheaper than exporting from Japan (see Beeson 1997, CEDA 1997 and 
Edgington 1990).  A multinational corporation’s overseas investment is a 
defensive move in the sense that ‘a firm undertakes production in a foreign 
country to which it had previously exported extensively only when foreign 
production is necessary to stave off the loss of the market to local firms or other 
[multinational enterprises] … often [in] a response to increasing trade barriers’ 
(Dunning and Pearce 1985: 135).  Japanese foreign investment in Australia show 
that direct investment in Australia’s manufacturing sector (as an alternative to 
exporting and licensing) meant lower costs for the investing Japanese firm, an 
advantage that could not be replicated by competing [multinational enterprises] 
from other countries (Purcell et al. 1999: 72-74; 1999b: 80-81).  Consequently, 
during the height of post-war protective market governance in Australia, 
Japanese multinational enterprises found it more profitable to manufacture and 
sell in the Australian market (and often to export from it, too).  With the rise of 
neo-liberal market policy, this profitability was no longer guaranteed and 
foreign manufacturing investment in the Australian market began to shrink.1    
 
 
1  For example, the South Korean auto manufacturers export to the Australian market 
their low-price cars, 4WDs and vans for the last two decades but they never chose to 
manufacture in Australia.   
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Japanese business in Australia across the board has been in decline, including 
the manufacturing sector. In 1990 Nissan Motor Company (Australia) Pty Ltd2 
was planning to manufacture a new six-cylinder model3, but in 1992 the 
company shut down its Australian manufacturing.  Tariffs used to mean that 
overseas models attracted import tax and local manufacturers were protected, 
however, with market deregulation imports became cheaper and began to put 
pressure on manufacturers in Australia, many of which could not compete in 
the long run.  The continuous decrease in tariffs that used to protect Japanese 
foreign investment in Australia from competition is the major reason why 
Nissan Motor Company (Australia) Pty Ltd and MMAL shut down 
manufacturing in Australia. The lack of sufficient industry assistance for 
manufacturing investors is also another significant reason (AMWU 2003b: 36). 
The post-1992 market restructuring in Japan also affected Japanese foreign 
investment in Australia.  Japanese firms became more focused lower wage 
markets with bigger growth potential after the 1992 collapse of the ‘bubble 
economy’. Australia also suffers a ‘drought’ of greenfield foreign investment in 
manufacturing and various schemes to encourage commitment and 
performance among the present manufacturers  have also been weak (AMWU 
2003a: 1-5). 
 
2  Nissan Motor Company Limited marketed its products under the global brand name of 
Datsun until 1983.  In Australia the company also marketed its cars under the badges of the 
local subsidiaries of Ford and General Motors which is no longer the case. 
3  The final Nissan models produced in Australia were Skyline and its four-cylinder 
version named Pintara. 
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Figure 1: Japan's share of foreign investment in Australia (%) 
 
 
Figure 2: Japanese direct investment’s share within total Japanese foreign 
investment in Australia (%) 
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(AMWU 2003b: 36).  Further, foreign investment in Australia ‘is insufficiently 
directed to appropriate objectives’ (Jones 2004b: 2).  
 
Comprehensive data on the industries in which foreign companies directly 
invest Australia is not made available by government statistical agencies.4 As a 
result this paper cannot offer a precise investment history for TMC Australia 
and MMAL.5  What is clear, however, is that Japanese foreign investment’s 
share of total foreign investment6  in Australia has been shrinking (Figure 1). 
While Japan’s share of total foreign investment has been declining in the period 
under consideration7 this trend is the result of the broad changes in the market 
structures of both Japan and Australia.  Despite this decline of Japanese foreign 
investment in Australia, the direct investment component of the total Japanese 
foreign investment has been on the rise (see Figure 2).  That is, Japanese foreign 
investment is forming increasingly smaller share of the total foreign investment 
but more of it is in direct investment form as Figure 2 shows.  Australian 
Bureau of Statistics does not identify the companies or the sectors in which they 
 
4  Previously data sets have been published with different content coverage. In the East 
Asian Analytical Unit (1997) study Japanese foreign investment in Australia as of  30 June 1995 
was discussed by using data sets from a 1996 ABS study. Drysdale and Farrell (1999: 4-6) also 
discuss 1995 Japanese FDI levels by using the data from Japan’s Ministry of Finance Annual 
Report of the International Finance Bureau.  
5  See for example two major official surveys of Japanese firms in Australia which also did 
not have any financial data on the firms studied.  The 1996 survey is titled The Contribution to 
Employment and Exports by Japanese Companies in Australia (Federation of Japan Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry in Australia et al. 1997).  The 1999 survey is titled Second Survey of the 
Contribution to Employment and Exports of Japanese Affiliated Companies in Australia (Federation of 
Japan Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Australia et al. 2000). 
6  This decline in Japanese foreign investment can be considered in the broader context of 
the decline in Japanese foreign investment around the world. 
7  Since 2007 there were two major acquisitions of Australian companies by a 
Japanese multinational.  In August 2008, Japanese company Kirin Holdings purchased 
Dairy Farmers for A$910 million (AAP 2008).  In 2007, the same company acquired for 
A$2.8 billion, Australian dairy and fruit juice producer National Foods (AAP 2007: 1, 
ABC Rural 2007: 1).  In the same year Kirin Holdings also acquired Tasmanian brewer 
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invest.  Still, in broad terms direct investment entails manufacturing 
investment. 
 
In 2002-2006, the A$ value of Japanese foreign investment at ‘current prices’ has 
remained at similar levels while foreign investment from all other sources 
increased markedly. As total foreign investment went up from A$906,424 
million (in 2002) to A$1,439,974 million (in 2006), Japanese foreign investment 
increased from A$49,494 million to merely A$51,046 million (ABS 5352.0 2007 
time series data).  The end result of these processes is that Japanese foreign 
investment forms a much reduced percentage of the overall foreign investment 
in Australia.  As discussed below the government is looking at proposals of a 
substantial cash injection into the automotive manufacturing sector.  Especially 
the government spending on ‘the Green Car Innovation Fund’ can substantially 
benefit a high-tech manufacturer like Toyota Motor Corporation.  All this may 
bring in new Japanese investment in Australia’s manufacturing, which is 
precisely why it is useful to discuss this topic.  The below discussion here will 
focus on Toyota Motor Corporation Australia and Mitsubishi Motors Australia 
Limited after introducing the outlines of the current government auto industry 
assistance scheme and the one which is proposed for the near future. 
 
James Boag and Son, for A$325 million, through Lion Nathan which is a firm that is 
majority owned by Kirin Holdings (Reuters 2007: 1). 
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The Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme and the Global 
Automotive Transition Scheme  
 
The election of November 2007 brought the Rudd Labor government to power. 
Rudd and his team had expressed an acute interest in the overhaul of the 
relationship between government and the local manufacturing sector before the 
election.  The Rudd Labor government began promoting the view that Australia 
can be a better export performer with appropriate state assistance in the form of 
export market grants (see Simon Crean Press Release 2007b). The official 
emphasis appears to have shifted to export performance rather than market 
performance.8 But the new government made it clear that the free trade 
agreements signed by the Howard coalition government will remain in force 
(Sky News Sunday Business 2008: 2). Hence the assumptions behind the ideal 
of free trade in a global market are not debated at all. At the same time the 
Labor government argues that Australia’s export competitiveness can be lifted 
by state spending on infrastructure projects (including a nation-wide 
broadband network), school education and industrial skills training (Simon 
Crean Press Release 2007d). This is what Trade Minister Crean calls ‘the whole 
of government approach’ after years of low levels of investment in ‘skills 
retention rate’ and ‘the nation’s infrastructure’ under the former government 
(Sky News Sunday Business 2008). This ‘the whole approach of the 
government’ perhaps also can be described as a multi-faceted market 
intervention through public spending. 
 
 
8  Crean states that government policy mechanisms are necessary when there is market 
failure (Simon Crean Press Release 2007c). This may be interpreted as a Keynesian statement. 
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The Rudd Labor government, not long after gaining office, announced plans for 
a new financial assistance scheme for the car industry pending the results of a 
major review.9 In ‘an early indication of cooperative federalism’, Federal Trade 
Minister Simon Crean, responsible for the manufacturing sector, stated in 
December 2007 that the government would conduct a broad-ranging review of 
the car industry with a view to increase exports (Simon Crean Press Release 
2007a).10  In 14 February 2008 the government announced ‘a comprehensive 
review of Australia’s automotive industry’ (Kim Car Press Release 2008).  Terms 
of Reference for the Review of the Australian Automotive Industry included 
‘evaluation of the key outcomes of the Automotive Competitiveness and 
Investment Scheme’ (Department of Industry, Science and Research 2008b).  
Hence, as part the new government’s economic initiatives, the motor vehicle 
manufacturing industry in Australia was put under two federal reviews 
simultaneously.  The first one was the Review of Australia’s Automotive 
Industry headed by the former Victorian Premier Steve Bracks (Department of 
Innovation, Industry, Science and Research 2008a).  This was finalised in 
August 2008.  The second is the industry assistance modeling review carried 
out by the Productivity Commission (Kim Carr Press Release 2008).  
 
The former Howard coalition government’s motor vehicle manufacturing 
industry assistance package, the ACIS11 was announced in the May 2001 
 
9  The former Howard coalition government had also plans for a review in 2008.  
10  The new government has been promoting the view that Australia can be a better export 
performer with appropriate state assistance (see Simon Crean Press Release 2007b). 
11   Past federal government auto industry schemes included the Motor Industry 
Development Plan in the 1980s (‘The Button car plan’, named after federal Minister for 
Commerce, Trade and Industry Senator John Button, under the Hawke Labor government). 
This plan sought to instigate co-operative manufacturing between different auto makers in 
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budget (the scheme began in 2001 and was reviewed in 2002). The scheme was 
an example of how foreign multinational motor vehicle makers respond to 
domestic spending ‘encouragement’. It is difficult to see how car manufacturing 
could have existed without such measures.   
 
The ACIS, from 2010 onwards will be replaced with a new scheme.  So what is 
the new blue-print for state intervention in the market?  The 2008 Review of 
Australia’s Automotive Industry Final Report, states that, between 2010 and 2020, 
the motor vehicle manufacturing industry should be assisted by the Global 
Automotive Transition Scheme [GATS] which will complement the Green Car 
Innovation Fund (Review of Australia’s Automotive Industry Final Report 2008: 98).  
If enacted, the GATS would provide A$1.5 billion in assistance, to the firms in 
the automotive sector between 2010 and 2015.  From 2016 to 2020 the 
government may provide another A$1 billion.  The Green Car Innovation Fund 
will pay out A$500 million from 2009 onwards over a five year period with the 
possibility of paying out a further A$500 million (Review of Australia’s 
Automotive Industry Final Report: 98).  The new system will provide 5 per cent 
(down from 10 per cent) tariff protection for the automotive industry from 2010 
onwards (Review of Australia’s Automotive Industry Final Report 2008: 97).  Hence, 
the existing tariff reduction program is still going ahead. 
 
The output of the remaining three carmakers (together with their local 
suppliers) form the biggest part of the manufacturing sector in Australia.  In 
2004 the car industry was worth A$20 billion and 139,000 out of 274,000 
 
Australia. The scheme sought to reduce the number of locally made models from thirteen to 
eight to achieve intra-industry consolidation. 
10 
 
  
 
vehicles that were manufactured in Australia were exported (Invest Australia 
2005: 1).12 In 200613, the value of Australian motor vehicle exports was A$4.86 
billion which consisted of A$3.07 billion from motor vehicle exports and A$1.78 
billion from motor vehicle component exports (Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources 2007d: 1). By early 2007, the industry’s employee 
numbers were 73,100 (7% of total manufacturing employment), and the 
industry accounted for 10 per cent of the A$60 billion of the total value added 
manufacturing and 1 per cent of Australia’s gross domestic product 
(Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 2007c: 23).14  However, the 
value of the A$ has been on the rise and motor vehicle manufacturers have 
frequently complained about it since late 2006. MMAL stated this as a factor in 
its decision to shut down production in Australia in 2008 (ABC Midday News 
2008).15 The challenge for the remaining local manufacturers is to remain 
competitive in the face of cheaper imports from subsidised overseas producers. 
In their effort to remain viable, local car manufacturers have increasingly 
procured supplies from overseas and pushed many Australian supply 
 
12  By contrast, in 2002, the auto industry turnover was worth A$17 billion and it 
employed over 54,000 people (17,000 in vehicle assembly and 30,000 in component production) 
and exported 100,000 cars (around 30 per cent of the local production) (Productivity 
Commission 2002b: 20). 
13  The sources that are quoted on auto industry are not published regularly. As a result 
not all types of data are published every year. 
14  The reported number of employees in this sector fluctuates frequently. As of November 
2005, the industry was reported to be employing 81,000 people (Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources 2007a). 
15  In the early 2000s when rumors were rife that MMAL would soon shut down 
manufacturing in Australia, there was some suggestion that Daimler Chrysler AG, then-
Mitsubishi Motor Corporation Ltd’s major shareholder, would purchase the MMAL production 
facilities to manufacture jeeps for the four-wheel-drive market in Asia (Jiji 1999a: 12). It was also 
reported that Chrysler Jeep planned to build vehicles in MMAL‘s Adelaide plant by sharing the 
(now superseded) Magna platform (McKay 2003b: 1). From September 2007 onwards (till the 
March 2008 shutdown) Mitsubishi Motor Corporation used to own 100% of Mitsubishi Motors 
Australia Limited (MMAL).  
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manufacturers, mainly small-to-medium businesses, to absorb unsustainable 
levels of costs, and this has eventuated in bankruptcies (Wilson 2005b: 17). 
 
The ACIS led to new foreign investment in the early 2000s. It guaranteed the car 
industry protection worth A$10 billion and subsidies equalling A$4.2 million 
for a ten-year period. The scheme has made available A$57 million net each to 
General Motors Holden (GM Holden), TMC Australia, Ford Motor Company of 
Australia and MMAL per year until 2015 (Marris 2002b: 4). Another A$2.8 
billion was allocated to the ACIS for production and investment by vehicle 
producers and investment by component producers.  This assistance, spread 
over five years, attempted to shore up labour-intensive industries in regional 
Australia (Knight 2002: 23). Although somewhat modest when considered in 
annual terms, in gross terms, this meant a 14/4 ratio of federal funds to private 
investment under the present arrangement, without taking into consideration 
the value of the ongoing concerns with paid-up capital (Marris 2002b: 4). State 
interventions in the Australian market co-exist with the official neo-liberal 
orthodoxy. The Scheme is something of a limited solution, as the problem it is 
trying to alleviate is not limited to the motor vehicle manufacturing industry 
but is the outcome of the overall market structure in Australia.  One 
shortcoming became apparent in different periods in the last decade when the 
value of A$ rose which meant the exporters in motor vehicle manufacturing 
industry lost market share overseas. 
 
The ACIS commenced in January 2001 and ‘was initially to run until December 
2005’, but in December 2002 a further assistance budget was announced and the 
life of the scheme was extended ‘until (at least) 2015’ (Productivity Commission 
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2004: 3.19). However, as discussed above, the 2008 Review of Australia’s 
Automotive Industry Final Report states that from 2010 the Global Automotive 
Transition Scheme will govern the motor vehicle manufacturing industry.   
 
In 2001-2005 the ACIS provided A$2.8 billion of assistance to the Australian 
motor vehicle manufacturing industry and an estimated additional A$4.2 
billion was made available (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 
2007a: 1). Tariffs on motor vehicle imports have been reduced every single year 
in the last decade (see Table 1 below). From January 2000 to December 2004 
tariffs on imported new passenger motor vehicles were 15 per cent. From 1 
January 2005 they dropped to 10 per cent, where they will stay until 2010 
(Productivity Commission 2007: 3.16).  ‘Automotive tariffs’ will be reduced to 5 
per cent in 2010 and will remain at that level until 2015. This was reiterated by 
the 2008 Review of Australia’s Automotive Industry Final Report (2008: 97). 
Table 1: Auto industry tariff rate reductions 1990-201016 (%) 
Year Tariff percentage 
1990 40 
1991 37.5 
1992 35 
1993 32.5 
1994 30 
1995 27.5 
1996 25 
1997 22.5 
1998 20 
1999 17.5 
2000 15 
2005 10 
2010 5 
Data Source: Productivity Commission (2002b: 31, 2007: 3.16), Review of Australia’s Automotive 
Industry Final Report (2008: 97). 
 
 
 
16  The value for 2010 is a projection as of August 2008. 
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In December 2006 motor vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers requested a 
tariff freeze from the federal government (The Age 2006a: 1). However they were 
told by the former Treasurer Peter Costello that they had to ‘cure their own ills’ 
(The Age 2006b: 1). The former federal Finance Minister Minchin (of the Howard 
coalition government) indicated, in February 2007, that the current levels of 
tariffs (10 per cent) would be frozen if the 2008 Howard coalition government 
review [that was planned at the time] found that the car industry cannot cope 
with further loss of tariff protection (Murphy 2007: 1).17 Tariff freeze requests 
from motor vehicle and motor vehicle-parts manufacturers continued. On the 
eve of the 2007 federal election Premier John Brumby of the state of Victoria 
(and Premier Mike Rann of the state of South Australia) expressed support for 
freezing tariffs on car and car parts imports as Toyota Motor Corporation 
threatened to shut down manufacturing in Australia in the face of the 
continuous rise in the value of the A$ that made exports more expensive (Davis 
and Newman 2007: 1). Rann especially supported the idea that the tariff freeze 
should not even be debated till 2015 given that his state, South Australia, lost 
thousands of jobs in the last decade (Walker and Faulkner 2007: 1). The 
following year MMAL quit production in South Australia.  GM Holden’s 
exports to the USA also suffered as the export deal was signed when the A$ 
was US 73 cents which by the end of 2007 became US 90 cents (Walker and 
Faulkner 2007:1).18  
 
 
17  This was right after GM Holden announced that it would cut 600 jobs in South 
Australia, the home state of the Finance Minister (Murphy 2007: 1). 
18  Motor vehicle and motor vehicle-parts manufacturers in Australia are hurt by the 
soaring Australian dollar and the new manufacturing sites in China with large-scale, high-tech 
plants and highly skilled, stable and lower-paid workforces (Shanahan 2007: 1). 
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Before it lost the November 2007 election, the Howard Coalition government’s 
official line was that its tariff policy would stay on course and there would 
never be a return to ‘protectionism’ (The Age 2007a: 1) even though there was a 
clearly visible and continuous decline in the manufacturing sector.  Review of 
Australia’s Automotive Industry Final Report shows that there is no way of 
sustaining local production without public investment in the market. The local 
motor vehicle manufacturing industry, which does not have the economies of 
scale to manufacture a large range of vehicles, is oriented towards 
manufacturing large size cars. The very fact that economies of scale do not exist 
may be interpreted as sufficient evidence for the necessity of compensatory 
market intervention.   
 
The demand for smaller vehicles can only be fulfilled by imports. It is these 
smaller-sized and hence more environmentally friendly imported cars that 
flood the Australian market thanks to low tariffs (Murphy 2007: 1). While 
Australia’s tariffs for car imports were being reduced in the 1990s, in some 
Asian countries tariffs on imports have been, at times, as high as 120 per cent 
(Sturrock 2002: 20). The four car makers’ request in December 2006 for a tariff 
freeze specifically asked the federal government for protection against ‘cheaper 
Asian produced imports’ (Murphy 2007: 1). The continuous lowering of tariffs 
has contributed to the shrinking of the size of the local car industry over the last 
decade.  
 
The motor vehicle manufacturing industry is increasingly challenged by 
imports. Japanese car manufacturers in Australia began to lose on price 
competitiveness in the mid-1990s (at the same time as the exit of Nissan Motor 
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Company (Australia) Pty Ltd)19, and again from 2000-2002 as the Australian 
dollar kept losing value.  The manufacturers had to pay more and more for the 
components they had to import.  It was after that, in May 2004, that MMAL 
announced the closure of one of its two engine plants in South Australia where 
the company had long been based.  Finally, MMAL shut down all manufacture 
in March 2008.  What is the nature of this slow decline?  The paper considers 
this question next. 
 
Motor vehicle manufacturers and the continuous shrinking of the sector 
 
GM Holden, TMC Australia and Ford Motor Company of Australia (and 
MMAL until March 2008) owe their presence in Australia to the judgments of 
their parent companies, and they form only a small part of their parents’ global 
plans (Autopolis 2004: 6).20 These multinational motor vehicle makers started 
manufacturing in Australia to supply the small local market protected behind 
tariff barriers, and presently remain in Australia although in this post-tariff 
environment the future is uncertain.  In 2007, Toyota Motor Corporation 
Australia manufactured 45 per cent of the total local production volume and the 
rest was split between GM Holden, Ford Motor Company of Australia and 
MMAL (Toyota Motor Corporation Australia 2008: 11). 
 
At its peak in the early 1970s, there were nine multinational motor vehicle 
makers that manufactured in Australia: Ford Motor Company of Australia, GM 
Holden, International Harvester, Chrysler LLC, Nissan Motor Company 
 
19  After shutting down its Australian plant in 1996, Nissan Motor Company Limited (the 
mother company of Nissan Motor Company (Australia) Pty Ltd) became a major exporter to 
Australia, utilising its already existing extensive commercial facilities.  Renault S.A. relaunched 
its imports into Australia using the same facilities (The Japan Times 2000c: 10). 
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(Australia) Pty Ltd, TMC Australia, MMAL, Volkswagen and British Leyland 
Motor Corporation (ESCAP 2002: 21). Australia also hosts foreign companies 
that assemble ‘large trucks‘ that are crucial for transport logistics networks of 
Australian industries.  In 2005 Mercedes, Volvo and Scania assembled 838 units 
between them (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 2005: 25).  As 
of 2008, Iveco, Volvo (which also assembles Mack) and Kenworth assemble in 
Australia and this, in industry-wide terms, translates into approximately 10,000 
jobs (Truck Industry Council 2008: 1-3).  In the nation’s automotive history, 
there were also several local firms that assembled cars and components in 
Australia such as the Harnett Organisation that began assembling Nissan 
Bluebirds in 1966 at the Pressed Metal Corporation Plant in Sydney (see 
www.nissan.com.au).  Much earlier, in 1913 Holden and Frost began fitting 
bodies to different types of carriages, and they were bought by General Motors 
in 1931 (see www.media.gm/aus/holden).  
 
The industry has not been doing well as tariff reduction continues.  For 
example, 2005 was a year of record sales but the four carmakers barely broke 
even (Porter 2005:21). Motor vehicle manufacturing worldwide is dominated by 
multinational manufacturers even though some developing nations’ firms are 
increasingly challenging this with their very large markets and extremely low 
production costs, as in the case of low-price Tata Nano model from India.  In 
the developed world, the motor vehicle manufacturing sector accounts for 
almost 11 per cent of GDP, and it supplies one in nine jobs in the global jobs 
market (Drive 2004b: 1). The global motor vehicle manufacturing industry is 
 
20  It should be noted that GM Holden Melbourne facilities constitute an important design 
centre for GM’s global production of rear-wheel-drives (Porter 2007: 5). 
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able to exist without manufacturing in Australia but the reverse is not 
necessarily true. The motor vehicle and motor vehicle-parts manufacturing 
sector makes a significant contribution to the Australian economy (McDonald 
2003b: 18).  At the same time the global auto manufacturing is a gigantic 
industrial sector that significantly contributes to global petrol consumption and 
the consequent greenhouse emissions. Australia is fourth, per capita, in global 
contributions to the burning of fossil fuel (ABC Midday News 2004). 
 
From the early 2000s onwards, Australia’s motor vehicle manufacturing 
industry had new investments from the four carmakers in response to the ACIS 
Scheme. New Japanese foreign investment included A$1 billion from the 
Mitsubishi Motor Corporation (MMC), headquartered in Tokyo and Kyoto, in 
[now defunct] MMAL (McDonald 2003a: 18).  There was a A$500 million new 
investment from Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) [headquartered in Nagoya, 
Aichi] and another A$1 billion from Ford Motor Company [headquartered in 
Dearborn, Michigan] that formed the basis of the continuance of the motor 
vehicle manufacturing industry (McDonald 2002: 4).  Ford Motor Company of 
Australia, which began manufacturing in Australia in 1925, had revenues of 
A$3.45 billion in 2007 and in the same year its total capital expenditure levels 
were at A$7.2 billion (Ford Motor Company of Australia 2008: 8). 
 
GM Holden rolled out its plans for a new A$400 million engine plant in 
Melbourne and a new A$460 million plant in Adelaide which were both new 
foreign investments decided by General Motors [headquartered in Detroit].  
Over the last five years GM Holden invested more than A$3.6 billion in 
Australia and earned A$1.56 billion export revenue in 2007 (GM Holden 2008: 
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4).  In October 2002, GM Holden purchased a 42.1 per cent stake in Korea’s 
Daewoo for a half a billion dollars (after the 1997 Asian currency crisis that 
almost bankrupted the Korean carmaker), thus effectively linking up with the 
rest of the GM-Daewoo global operations (McDonald 2002: 32). As a result, GM 
Holden has moved from being a local manufacturer at the mercy of the tariffs 
policy to become a regional car production investor (McKay 2003a: 1). In 
August 2005, GM Holden announced up to 1400 lay-offs in its Elizabeth plant 
near Adelaide, citing falling sales, rising costs and cheaper competition. One 
thousand of these lay-offs were the jobs that had been created in January 2003 
to produce the top selling Commodore model (Wilson 2005a: 11). From 2008 
onwards, GM Holden plans to increase its production in its Elizabeth plant in 
South Australia to 140,000 units, with 30,000 going to the USA market, 40,000 
for the Middle East and the rest being sold in Australia and New Zealand 
(Porter 2007: 1).  In June 2008 GM Holden had further lay-offs as its Fisherman’s 
Bend [Port Melbourne] engine production facility closed down even though the 
27 year old facility was quite internationally-oriented and had exported 136,000 
engines in 2007 (Cooper 2008, Rennie 2008). 
 
Currency fluctuations can also have a major effect. Motor vehicle manufacturers 
buy components in foreign currency, and they can absorb losses from 
exchange-rate fluctuations for only so long before the prices have to go up 
(McKay 2003c: 1). In fact it was the dollar fluctuations that led TMC Australia to 
seek local suppliers and to increase local content in the 1990s, and which later 
also led MMAL to rationalise and restructure its supplier networks (McDonald 
2003b: 18, Porter 2002a: 33). MMAL cited the rising value of the A$ as one of the 
reasons, alongside the lack of sufficient tariff protection, for its closure of its last 
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manufacturing plant in Australia (ABC Midday News 2008).  The year 2004 was 
characterised by job losses in MMAL, followed by the GM Holden lay-offs in 
2005. The trend continued.  The 2008 closure by MMAL also created a large 
pool of unemployed manufacturing workers (Carswell 2008: 3). 21 
Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited (MMAL) 
MMAL’s manufacturing facilities in Adelaide were set up originally by 
Chrysler in 1966. Following the 1970s oil price hikes, Chrysler started 
manufacturing the four cylinder Mitsubishi Sigma models in Adelaide in 1978 
under license. But in 1980, Chrysler LLC’s manufacturing facilities in Australia 
was taken over by MMAL and Chrysler LLC brand was never again produced 
locally. A possible reason MMAL’s Australian production survived in Australia 
into 2008 (far longer than Nissan22) was because Mitsubishi Motor Corporation 
(MMC) was in a tie-up with Daimler Chrysler for long period of time.23 This 
allowed the company some breathing space in its Australian operations. 
MMAL went through several upheavals in its South Australian operations prior 
to its 2008 exit.  
 
The capacity utilisation rate of the Adelaide plant in the late 1990s was already 
below profitability, producing only 35,000 units annually despite its 70,000-unit 
 
21  Elsewhere the situation is also grim for auto manufacturers.  In the USA, economic 
forecasts show that a massive 50 per cent of the domestic motor vehicle-parts manufacturers 
will be out of business by 2015 as a result of foreign competition (Bloomberg TV 2005: 
September 9). In October 2005, the USA’s largest auto parts and components manufacturer, 
Delphi, filed for bankruptcy. 
22  Nissan  announced the start of its an alliance with Renault S.A. in 1999. 
23  Daimler Chrysler sold its final 12.4% stake in Mitsubishi Motor Corporation (MMC) of 
Japan on 11 November 2005 at a loss of US$800 million (BBC News 2005). MMC as a result 
became 100% Japanese owned, again. From 2001 onwards Mitsubishi Motor Corporation of 
Japan owned 100% of Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited (MMAL) which was an increase 
from its 50% ownership in 1992 when Mitsubishi Corporation (MC) [which is not the 
automotive manufacturer but the Japanese conglomerate] owned the other 50% of MMAL 
(www.mitsubishi-motors.com.au). 
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capacity (The Japan Times 2000b: 14). The firm’s overall performance in the 
Australian market was failing. In 1999, MMAL sold 67,000 cars in Australia 
(imports plus Australian-made), down from 81,000 in 1998 (The Japan Times 
2000b: 14).  In November 2000, after several reports in the Australian and 
Japanese media since 1999, the corporation announced a possible closure of its 
Adelaide plant as a result of the Australian government’s decision to cut import 
duties, a decision that meant domestically-made products were uncompetitive 
against imports (The Japan Times 2000e: 10). However, following that 
announcement, MMAL in Japan decided to raise its stake in the Australian 
subsidiary from 60 per cent to 80 per cent, by increasing the paid-up capital to 
A$279.3 million. All of the 172.41 million new shares issued by MMAL were 
underwritten by Mitsubishi Motor Corporation (MMC) in Japan. This did not 
continue beyond 2004, however, and MMC began looking to other investors as 
Daimler Chrysler refused further ‘bail-outs’.24  
 
MMC announced at its Tokyo headquarters on 21 May 2004 that it would close 
its Lonsdale engine plant in South Australia by late 2005 and lay off 700 people. 
The company also announced that its remaining car assembly plant in Adelaide 
may not have a future.25 The company’s overseas operations, on the other 
hand, would henceforth focus on producing 4WDs and sports cars.  In Japan, 
MMC had several rescue packages over the years from its partner firm Daimler 
Chrysler, but in 2004 a similar rescue package did not eventuate (McKay 2004b: 
1). It was the withdrawal of Daimler Chrysler’s support that led to the 2004 
 
24  In 2005 MMC became 100% Japanese owned (again) after having been co-owned (not 
necessarily at the same time) by Daimler Chrysler, Tokyo-based Phoenix Capital, the US based 
Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan.  
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restructuring of MMAL which also cost the Lonsdale engine plant. In the 2000s 
MMAL had expanded in Australia while the market shrank and its mother 
company was looking to restructure.  Following the announcement of the ACIS 
Scheme, MMAL outlaid A$1 billion in manufacturing investment and overhaul 
of the Adelaide plant, A$230 million of which was to go to a new R&D facility 
at Tailem Bend, near Adelaide (McDonald 2003a: 18).  When the 2004 
restructuring began, of the new A$1 billion commitment from MMAL, A$200 
million was already invested in the Australian market (McGuire 2004: 6).    
 
The Lonsdale shutdown was the beginning of the final chapter for MMAL. The 
federal government provided an A$15 million package to retain the Lonsdale 
workers. This was described as too little too late by the AMWU, which also 
argued that these manufacturing workers were too highly qualified to be easily 
re-employed and that similar work did not exist in the State26 . The AMWU 
stated that the years of lobbying the government for manufacturing assistance 
had been useless (SBS World News 18:30 PM 2004a, ABC 19:00 News 2004a).  
After the closure of Lonsdale engine plant, the federal government reaffirmed 
that A$35 million27 in assistance remained available to MMAL in 2004-2005 for 
 
25  The corporation sacked 30 per cent of the office staff in Japan and was planning to 
move its headquarters from Tokyo. 
26  For a discussion of the inability of highly-skilled manufacturing sector employees to 
find similar work, and their eventual employment in no-skill or low-skill work or joining the 
ranks of the long-term unemployed in Australia, see Beer and Thomas (2007), and Weller and 
Webber (2001). 
27  In the aftermath of the Lonsdale closure, the total spending package financed by the 
federal government was A$50 million that included funds for ‘investment facilitation and 
structural adjustment in South Australia, particularly southern Adelaide’ (Productivity 
Commission 2004: 3.19). 
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the establishment of an international research and development centre 
(Productivity Commission 2004: 3.20).28  
 
Following Lonsdale’s closure, MMAL focused on the rest of its business. The 
firm completed the construction of its new assembly facility with multiple 
manufacturing applications, which at the time of its completion was one of a 
kind in the Southern Hemisphere (ABC 7:30 Report South Australia 2004). It 
was a high-tech plant. By 2005, A$600 million was invested in Tonsley Park 
manufacturing facility’s retooling (see www.mitsubishi-
motors.com.au/company/history). 29 However, in 2008 all was over. After 
losing A$1.5 billion between 1998 and 2007, MMAL announced in February 
2008 that it would totally quit manufacturing in Australia (Carswell 2008: 3). By 
the time of its announcement, MMAL was selling merely 1,000 units of its 38030 
model per month, which had cost the company A$600 million in investment to 
develop (Carswell 2008: 3).31 MMAL’s closure in 2008 destroyed jobs in the 
supply-chain across Australia, as well as leading to a loss of manufacturing 
know-how and work skills.32  
 
 
28  The government estimates state that, at the production levels of 2004, MMAL could 
expect to receive around A$300 million in assistance from the government’s extension of the 
ACIS beyond 2006 (Productivity Commission 2004: 3.20). Due to its continuous losses the 
company chose to exit manufacturing in 2008. 
29  There was one further development. Hirotec, a Japanese company, began investing 
A$70 million, in August 2004 (three months after MMAL’s announcement of the closure of 
Lonsdale), in a manufacturing plant in South Australia for the production of car doors, bonnets 
and boot lids (Macfarlane 2004b). This new venture was granted major project facilitation (MPF) 
status by the federal government. 
30  Mitsubishi 380 was a replacement of Mitsubishi Magna model which has been 
marketed under Diamante badge in other countries.  MMAL, for a decade, used to also 
manufacture the Colt model. 
31  When MMAL exited manufacturing in Australia it pledged to return A$35 million. 
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Interestingly, the potential benefits from the free trade agreement between 
Australia and the USA did not persuade MMAL that it was worth maintaining 
their investment in Australia.  The company had exported to the North 
American markets in the past.33 The potential increase in export volumes 
appears to have been seen as insufficient to justify the cost of maintaining the 
production facility in South Australia, despite the fact that it was recently re-
tooled and upgraded.  MMAL never had a major market share, in comparison 
with the other three car-makers but it used relatively higher value-added 
engineering capacities for its small production volumes (McGuire 2004: 6).34 
MMAL, like TMC Australia, was export-oriented but to a much lesser extent. 
When mother company Mitsubishi Motor Corporation broke away from 
Daimler-Chrysler, MMAL lost important overseas dealership contacts which 
meant it became less able to penetrate the USA and EU markets. Until the break 
up it had been on more competitive ground.  Overall, MMAL had periods of 
strong performance.  
 
In 1996 MMAL was at a high point and shipping 180,000 V-6 engine blocks to 
Japan with solid plans to increase this to 380,000 [this was the year Nissan 
Motor Company (Australia) exited manufacturing] (Sedgwick 1996: 27).  The 
low value of the A$ at the time was a factor in this MMAL venture. Exports 
were priced competitively while the A$ was low. This success did not extend 
 
32  For example, the 2005 closure of the company’s South Australia engine plant reportedly 
cost 1,600 jobs elsewhere in South Australia, and 600 in Melbourne in related supplier 
businesses (ABC 19:00 News 2004a). 
33  According to the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement Fact Sheet 12 on car 
manufacturing, there will be no customs duties payable on cars made in Australia from the day 
the agreement enters into force.   
34  This was the case in its [then] new established assembly line (ABC news South 
Australia 2004). 
24 
 
  
 
into the 2000s as the domestic market in Australia was flooded with cheaper 
imports.  The value of the A$ was generally on the up. The MMAL engine plant 
was shut down in the 2004-2005 restructuring which followed the period of rise 
in the value of the A$. In 2004, Magna model exports to the USA were around 
4,500 down from 16,000, and the Australian sales were down by 8,000 to 22,000 
a year, a far cry from the company’s 10.1 per cent Australia market share in 
1995 (McKay 2004b: 1). The company’s total exports of 24,000 units out of 
Adelaide in 2002 fell to 10,000 units in 2003 and were falling further in 2004 
(McGuire 2004: 6). When MMAL quit Australian production in 2008 it was 
selling less than 12,000 cars a year while it needed to sell three times as many 
just to remain afloat (Hepworth 2008: 21).  
 
Japan’s global motor vehicle manufacturing suffered a set back in the late 1990s 
with the Nissan Motor Company Ltd’s financial troubles. This was a decline 
from the situation in 1980, the year global Japanese car production volumes 
overtook that of US firms (Drive 2004a: 1). With the emergence of foreign 
carmakers in China’s cheap labour market environment, and the return of the 
South Korean carmakers from the 1997 Asian crisis, the remaining MMAL plant 
in Adelaide was the weakest link in the Australian manufacturing chain for 
some time.  MMC repeatedly talked of withdrawing investment from Australia 
(SBS News at 18:30 PM 2004a, ABC 19:00 News 2004a). MMAL, both as a 
producer of cars and as a customer of suppliers, represented a major proportion 
of South Australia’s industrial base and was very important to the state’s 
economic fortunes (McKay 2004b: 1). When MMAL shut down the loss to the 
state’s economy was significant.   
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Toyota Motor Corporation Australia (TMC Australia) 
TMC Australia has been a major car manufacturer in Australia.  Since 1963 it 
manufactures cars in Australia and its engine manufacturing started in 1978.  
The company has made inroads into government fleet purchases in Australia 
with its second generation hybrid model, 50 per cent of which it sold to 
government in 2003-2004 financial year (McKay 2004a: 1). TMC Australia is, like 
MMAL, a 100 per cent Japanese-owned manufacturer in Australia.  TMC 
Australia exported 59,200 cars in 2001 and imported 100,000 from its Japan and 
Thailand plants. In 2003 TMC Australia exported 66,000 units of the Australian-
made Camry model to twenty countries from its Altona plant, bringing in A$1.4 
billion in ‘export revenue’ (V Facts 2004: 1-2).35 The company’s total Australian 
sales revenue in 2004 was A$7.42 billion (the sum of imports from Japan and 
local production) with a net profit of A$76.6 million (Porter 2005: 21). In 2006, 
the company exported 80,000 motor vehicles from its Altona, Melbourne plant 
to 20 countries that brought A$1.5 billion revenue, and projects to export 90,000 
units in 2007 (TMC Australia 2007).  
 
TMC Australia has been a successful manufacturer in Asia and particularly in 
ASEAN markets. It has been able to use the intra-ASEAN export credits to its 
advantage by dividing up component production among host ASEAN 
countries. Moreover, it has been able to increase its market share and stay 
ahead of its European and US rivals with relatively little effort (The Japan Times 
2000d: 12).36 TMC Australia, and to a lesser extent MMAL, have been exporting 
 
35  TMC Australia (and MMAL till March 2008) represents a large part of the high-end 
manufacture exports from Australia.  
36  In contrast, GM, Ford and Daimler Chrysler all had to get used to the Asian 
competition (Harbour Report 2000: 1-2). Ford Motor Company of Australia and GM Holden 
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out of Australia. They are also well-linked with the global operations of their 
parent companies.37  
 
TMC Australia has been also a major importer of models into Australia in all 
ranges, from trucks and utes to luxury cars. TMC Australia’s two Australian-
produced models, Camry and Avalon (discontinued and replaced by the locally 
designed and manufactured Aurion which is based on the Camry platform), 
have local value-added parts. By 2002 TMC Australia had reduced components 
sourced from Japan, and was instead using Australian industry for alternative 
components in a bid to make the Altona plant ‘a yen-free zone’ (Asano 2002: 
24). However, by 2004-2005 it was back to using overseas suppliers that 
underquoted Australian suppliers to reduce costs. In 2002-2003 MMAL also 
overhauled its supplier relations to integrate them into its operations as it 
outsourced the manufacture of major components, 41 per cent of which come 
from Victoria and 48 per cent from South Australia (McDonald 2003a: 18).38 
However, with the 2008 shutting down of the final MMAL engine plant all of 
the restructuring in the 2000s came to very little. 
 
The local producers are concerned about increasing overseas competition and 
they worry about the future as the tariffs are steadily reduced.  While the 2008 
Review of Australia’s Automotive Industry was under way in 2008, the motor 
vehicle manufacturers kept lobbying the government on the benefits of 
 
reportedly compel their Australian suppliers to reduce costs by 30 per cent to match the 
Chinese manufacturers’ prices (Kohler 2004a: 21). 
37  MMAL often had to get its headquarters in Tokyo to deny rumours of an imminent 
shutdown of the remaining Adelaide plant (see McGuire 2004: 6).  
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maintaining tariff levels on a par with trading partners, in conjunction with 
support mechanisms like the ACIS Scheme (See the submissions from Denso 
Australia Group (2008), Toyota Motor Corporation Australia (2008), Ford Motor 
Company of Australia (2008), General Motors Holden (2008) ). The ACIS has 
underwritten the individual carmakers’ own investments for new research and 
development facilities which sustained local jobs (McDonald 2002: 4, Marris 
2002a: 4).39  
Table 2: Automotive industry R&D expenditure annual growth in Australia 
1996-2005 (%) 
Year Annual growth percentage 
1996/97 -1.5 
1997/98 14.8 
1998/99 -11.9 
1999/00 9.9 
2000/01 9.6 
2001/02 28.5 
2002/03 26.2 
2003/04 15.3 
2004/05 1.1 
Data Source: Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (2005: 38) 
 
As can be seen from the above Table 2  in 2001/2002, which was the year when 
the ACIS commenced, automotive companies’ research and development 
investment grew by 28.5 per cent from the previous year.  By contrast, in 
2004/2005, the annual growth of automotive industry research and 
development was only 1.1 per cent (car tariffs dropped by 5 per cent on 1 
January 2005). Private investment seems to have increased when government 
intervened in the market.  When the tariff protection of the market was 
 
38  The company did this to counter the power of the unions of its suppliers’ workers, who 
had been demanding guarantees of protection of member entitlements from company closures 
(McDonald 2003a). 
39  The automotive industry firms spent A$7.2 billion on research and development in 
2004-2005 (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 2007d: 1). 
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weakened, private investment growth appears to have declined. This possible 
correlation should be the focus of future studies. 
 
Conclusion 
The successful expansion of exports of the motor vehicle manufacturing 
industry is not related to the tariff reductions, as claimed by neo-liberals (Jones 
2002a: 56).  This is also apparent in the way in which research and development 
investment increased with public investment in the market. Tariffs levels are 
being reduced but public investment continues. Is public spending necessary if 
all that is needed is a continuous decrease of the tariff levels, as Jones asks 
(2002a: 56). This comment is an accurate observation on the contradictory 
processes of reducing tariffs for a supposedly freer trade while carrying out 
public investment. The ACIS has allowed Australia to maintain the greater part 
of its national manufacturing base, its skilled workforce, its technological know-
how, its payroll tax base, its export dollars and its thousands of related jobs in 
other sectors and many other tangible and intangible benefits that are not 
measurable by the curriculum of the neo-liberal economics textbooks. In 
contrast, tariff reductions only threaten to destroy the manufacturing base 
instead of making it competitive. Assistance schemes and free trade policies co-
exist. Under neo-liberal rhetoric and practice, a mixture of monetarist and 
Keynesian ideas are utilised (Quiggin 2001a: 26, 13). Of course, this ‘mixture’ 
does not eradicate the damage done by market deregulation. Assistance 
schemes such as the one discussed above are little rare islands of Keynesianism 
in a deluge of deregulation. It may be comforting to show that Keynesianism is 
still alive, after a fashion, but market deregulation is still the economic 
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orthodoxy, despite lack of success for the manufacturing base and 
manufactured exports. 
 
Tariff reductions under neo-liberalism has been raised repeatedly in 2006 and 
2007 by both US (GM Holden and Ford Motor Company of Australia) and 
Japanese (TMC Australia and MMAL) motor vehicle manufacturers as the 
reason why Australia’s largest value-added manufacturing sector faces trouble, 
especially with the continuous rise in the value of the Australian dollar.  Future 
studies will determine whether these trends will continue. The verdict for now 
is that Japanese foreign investment, especially manufacturing investment in 
Australia, has been in a continuous decline under neo-liberal market 
governance, and that tariffs reductions are identified as one of the causes. Since 
late 2006, motor vehicle and motor vehicle-parts manufacturers, including the 
Japanese firms TMC Australia (and now-defunct MMAL) have sought, as seen 
also in their submissions to the 2008 Review of Australia’s Automotive 
Industry, a tariff reduction freeze, a demand which was brought about partially 
by the continuous rise in the value of the Australian dollar that made exports to 
overseas markets more expensive.40  Such a freeze is likely to be resisted in 
some departments where neo-liberal mindset has a well established hegemony.  
As stated above, Review of Australia’s Automotive Industry Final Report has 
recommended that ‘automotive tariffs’ should be reduced to 5 per cent in 2010, 
in line with the existing federal policy.  It is now clear that from 2008 onwards 
auto manufacturers in Australia will enter a crucial phase as the federal 
 
40  This is of course partially a result of another deregulation in the history of Australian 
market policy; the currency market which has to be the topic of another paper. 
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government completes the formulation of its tariff and assistance policies for 
the sector’s future. 
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